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Market valuation of greenhouse gas emissions under a mandatory 
reporting regime: evidence from the UK 
 
Abstract 
This study provides evidence on the potential benefits of mandatory environmental reporting 
for listed firms’ market valuation. It takes advantage of recent regulation that requires all listed 
firms in the UK to report their annual greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in their annual reports 
and shows that the magnitude of the negative association between GHG emissions and the 
market value of listed firms decreased after the introduction of the reporting regulation. This 
decline is attributed to regulation forestalling shareholders’ negative reflexive reaction 
towards firms’ carbon disclosures, as proposed by the theoretical work of Unerman and 
O’Dwyer (2007). 
 
Keywords: Greenhouse gas emissions; Value relevance; London Stock Exchange; Mandatory 
disclosures; Reporting regulation 
 
1. Introduction 
It is widely acknowledged that sustainability reporting plays a pivotal role in the endeavor 
to establish a new, sustainable economic model worldwide, which will combine desirable 
financial outcomes with environmental protection, among other outcomes (European Council 
and Parliament, 2014; IIRC, 2013). Undeniably, the reporting of greenhouse gas1 (hereafter 
GHG) emissions, as a first step toward reduction of GHG emissions (DEFRA, 2010), is of 
paramount importance to this endeavor. This is evident both from the plethora of international 
and national initiatives for GHG emissions reporting2 and from the ever-growing research on 
this topic3. 
What is also evident is that capital markets have been one of the key factors in the 
development of GHG emissions reporting since investors integrate this information into their 
investment decision-making (Kauffmann et al, 2012). Indeed, recent studies have shown that 
there is a significant negative association between the level of a firm’s GHG emissions and its 
market valuation (Chapple et al, 2013; Clarkson et al, 2015; Matsumura et al, 2014), which is 
attributed to investors using GHG emissions as a proxy for assessing firms’ unbooked future 
environmental liabilities (Clarkson et al, 2004; Hughes, 2000; Matsumura et al, 2014). 
Nevertheless, GHG emissions reporting has been — and still is in most jurisdictions and for 
most firms around the world — voluntary, with recent studies questioning the quality of such 
                                                 
1 In this study, the terms ‘greenhouse gas’ and ‘carbon’ are used interchangeably. 
2 Examples include the Carbon Disclosure Project, the North American Climate Registry, the Australian National 
Greenhouse and Energy Reporting Act and the Canadian Greenhouse Gas Emissions Reporting Program, to name 
a few. 
3 Ascui (2014) finds that the number of published research papers in the broad field of carbon accounting (which 
includes carbon reporting) tripled in 2009 compared with the previous year, and the number has continued to 
increase at an average of 66% per year since then. 
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voluntary disclosures (Andrew & Cortese, 2011; Kolk et al, 2008; Stanny & Ely, 2008; Sullivan 
& Gouldson, 2012). Unerman and O’Dwyer (2007) argue that, when a negative environmental 
externality of firms’ activities attracts public attention, shareholders react reflexively by 
increasing their socially constructed perception about firms’ environmental risk. In turn, this 
increased perception of risk leads to a reduction of shareholders’ trust in firms’ voluntary 
disclosures and, consequently, to a decline in shareholders’ value. In recent years, carbon 
emissions have come into the spotlight as possibly the main cause of global warming 
(Kauffmann et al, 2012; Stern, 2007). Hence, following the rationale of Unerman and O’Dwyer 
(2007), voluntary carbon emissions reporting may have lost its trustworthiness, and 
consequently, capital market participants may impose an extra valuation penalty when they 
value GHG emissions.  
Mandatory GHG emissions reporting has been suggested as a means for mitigating the 
above problem (Kolk et al, 2008; Rankin et al, 2011; Sullivan & Gouldson, 2012; Unerman & 
O’Dwyer, 2007). If this proposition is true, then the negative association between market value 
and carbon emissions is expected to decline in magnitude after the introduction of a mandatory 
GHG emissions reporting regulation. Bewley (2005) provides some evidence of a decline in the 
valuation penalty imposed by investors when they value-booked environmental liabilities 
accruals after the introduction of reporting regulation. Nevertheless, whether investors value 
non-financial environmental information and specifically GHG emissions differently in a 
mandatory reporting context compared with a voluntary reporting regime is an open empirical 
question (Andrew and Cortese, 2011).  
Since GHG emissions reporting has been largely voluntary, previous studies about GHG 
emissions have focused primarily on voluntary disclosures (Freedman and Park, 2014). This 
study takes advantage of the recent amendments of the UK Companies Act 2006 (Strategic 
Report and Directors’ Reports) Regulations 2013 (hereafter the 2013 Regulation), which 
requires all firms listed on the London Stock Exchange (hereafter LSE) to report their annual 
GHG emissions in their director’s report for financial years ending on or after September 30, 
2013, and seeks to provide empirical evidence on whether the expected negative association 
between firms’ market valuation and GHG emissions declined in magnitude after the 
introduction of a mandatory GHG emissions reporting regulation. 
The UK is an interesting setting for the empirical examination of this research question 
because, according to DEFRA (2012), it is the first country whose listed firms are required to 
include carbon emissions data for their entire organization in their annual reports. Although 
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regulations4 related to environmental issues were in place before the introduction of the 2013 
Regulation and the vast majority of large listed firms on the LSE disclosed their carbon 
emissions voluntarily before September 2013 5 , there are reasons to believe that the 
introduction of a regulation that requires firms to report their annual GHG emissions should 
have a significant impact on their market valuation. First, de Villiers and van Staden (2011) 
provide evidence that investors in the UK prefer mandatory environmental disclosures to 
voluntary disclosures, especially when these disclosures are provided through firms’ annual 
reports. The increasing quantity of environmental disclosures found in annual reports of UK 
firms suggests that environmental issues are of growing economic concern (de Aguiar & 
Bebbington, 2014). Furthermore, Tauringana and Chithambo (2015) conclude that in the UK 
setting, only reporting regulations can make firms disclose information that is useful to 
stakeholders. In addition, according to DEFRA (2013), mandatory reporting of GHG emissions 
offers the reporting firms the opportunity to signal strong green credentials to the market. 
Similar views in favor of mandatory GHG emissions reporting have been expressed by public 
authorities and industry representatives. For instance, Caroline Spelman, the then-Secretary of 
State for the Environment, said in June 2012 that “…the reporting of greenhouse gas emissions 
will give them [A/N: the investors] vital information as they decide where to invest their 
money.” (DEFRA, 2012), whereas two months before the introduction of the then-new 
regulation, David Harris, the Head of the Environmental Social and Governance branch of the 
FTSE Russell Index, stated the following: 
 “While the new regulations are not a silver bullet, they will be an improvement for 
investors in companies on LSE's [A/N: London Stock Exchange’s] main market, providing data 
that may help with their investment decisions. By making reporting compulsory, data 
availability and quality will improve, as voluntarily reported data can often be unreliable.” 
(Paddison, 2013) 
By utilizing a sample of all non-financial firms listed on the LSE for which GHG emissions 
data are available for the four-year period of 2011–2014 and employing a linear price-level 
model that associates a firm’s share price to GHG emissions, this study provides evidence that 
                                                 
4  The Companies Act 2006 requires listed firms to provide a narrative in their annual reports about their 
environmental issues to the extent that it is necessary for the understanding of firms’ performance, but it does not 
require disclosure of GHG emissions. The Carbon Reduction Commitment 2010 requires firms that use more than 
6,000 MWh per year of energy to measure their emissions, but they must report this information to the 
governmental Environment Agency and not to the public [for further information about previous regulations, see 
Kauffmann et al (2012) and KPMG et al (2013)]. 
5 The Carbon Disclosure Project has been publishing reports about the annual carbon emissions of FTSE 350 firms 
listed on the LSE since 2006. Further information can be found here: https://www.cdp.net/en-
US/Results/Pages/All-Investor-Reports.aspx.  
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first, similar to other jurisdictions around the world, GHG emissions are negatively associated 
with firms’ market value in the LSE for the whole period under examination; second, the 
magnitude of the negative association between firms’ market price and carbon emissions 
decreased after the introduction of the 2013 Regulation and; third, the magnitude of the 
negative association between market value and GHG emissions declined only for firms that 
belong to energy-intensive industries. 
This study adopts the theoretical propositions of Unerman and O’Dwyer (2007), who draw 
from Giddens’s reflexive modernity concept (as cited in Unerman & O’Dwyer, 2007) in terms of 
the interaction among reflexivity, risk and trust and intends to contribute to the recent 
academic debate regarding the market valuation implications of GHG emissions (Chapple et al, 
2013; Clarkson et al, 2015; Matsumura et al, 2014) by providing empirical evidence about the 
differences in the market valuation of emissions under a mandatory reporting regime. The 
findings can also be useful for capital market participants because they corroborate the notion 
that mandatory disclosures reduce shareholders’ perceptions of environmental risks related to 
GHG emissions. Finally, the results may be of interest to public and capital market authorities 
that have already introduced or plan to introduce some form of mandatory reporting of GHG 
emissions.  
The remainder of this study is structured as follows. The next section discusses the previous 
studies and develops the three hypotheses of the study; the third section describes the 
empirical model and the sample selection process; the fourth section presents the univariate, 
multivariate and additional analyses; the final section discusses the findings and draws 
conclusions. 
 
2. Background and hypotheses development 
In recent years, carbon emissions have attracted much attention due to the vivid debate 
around the anthropogenically induced global climate change and the potential policies to cope 
with this complex but urgent issue. Policies have been introduced at both national and 
international levels, with some of them attempting to translate an ecological issue into an 
economic phenomenon (Bebbington & Larrinaga-Gonzalez, 2008). For instance, the Stern 
Review on the Economics of Climate Change identifies disastrous impacts on the economy: 
“Using the results from formal economic models, the Review estimates that if we don’t act, 
the overall costs and risks of climate change will be equivalent to losing at least 5% of global 
GDP each year, now and forever. If a wider range of risks and impacts is taken into account, the 
estimates of damage could rise to 20% of GDP or more” (Stern, 2007, p. XV). 
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Capital markets have shown an increasing interest in the consequences of climate change 
in general and carbon emissions specifically (Kauffmann et al, 2012). For instance, Kolk et al 
(2008) identify investors as a key factor in the development of carbon accounting and 
reporting. Additionally, institutional investors require companies to provide them with 
information about climate-change-related risks and opportunities (Solomon et al, 2011), and 
Ascui (2014) identify that investors’ interest is expanding into new areas of carbon accounting, 
such as forest carbon accounting. 
Capital markets’ interest in the consequences of climate change has driven a number of 
scholars to examine the market valuation implications of firms’ environmentally related 
activities. The focus of a number of previous studies has been the relation between firms’ 
market valuation and their level of pollution, such as water pollution (Cormier and Magnan, 
1997), sulfur dioxide emissions (Hughes, 2000), toxic releases (Clarkson et al, 2004) and GHG 
emissions (Chapple et al, 2013; Clarkson et al, 2015; Matsumura et al, 2014). Using a research 
design similar to this study, these studies find a significant negative association between firms’ 
market valuation and levels of pollution. Specifically, Cormier and Magnan (1997) find that a 
firm’s level of water pollution is negatively associated with its market value, Hughes (2000) 
shows that sulfur dioxide emissions are negatively associated with firms’ market valuation, and 
Clarkson et al (2004) find that firms with high levels of toxic releases suffer a larger penalty in 
terms of their market capitalization than firms with low levels of releases. 
Regarding GHG emissions, Chapple et al (2013) use a weighted aggregation of emissions of 
various land, water and air pollutants of a sample of firms listed on the Australian Securities 
Exchange as a proxy for pollution performance. They find a negative relation between firm 
values and their levels of aggregated emissions. More importantly for this study, they find that 
GHG emissions (as reported voluntarily by their sample firms) are negatively associated with 
firms’ market valuation. Similarly, Matsumura et al (2014) find a negative association between 
voluntarily reported carbon emissions and firm value in a sample of firms listed on the S&P 
500. In addition, they find that firms that decide to not disclose their emissions bear an even 
higher penalty in terms of their market valuation. Finally, in a European context, Clarkson et al 
(2015) find a significant negative association between GHG emissions and the market value of 
firms in the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme. In summary, all previous studies 
unanimously conclude that GHG emissions are negatively associated with market value. Hence, 
even though the UK context has not been previously examined, it is reasonable to expect that 
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market valuation and GHG emissions of firms listed on the LSE are negatively associated. The 
first hypothesis that this study examines is formulated as follows6: 
 
H1. The greenhouse gas emissions of firms listed on the London Stock Exchange are negatively 
associated with their market value. 
 
Prior studies attribute the negative association between GHG emissions and market value 
to the use of GHG emissions by investors as a proxy for assessing firms’ unbooked future 
environmental liabilities (Clarkson et al, 2004; Hughes, 2000; Matsumura et al, 2014). 
However, it has been suggested that the voluntary nature of carbon disclosures has a negative 
effect on their perceived quality by capital market participants who may impose an extra 
penalty when they value environmental liabilities (Bewley, 2005). For instance, Andrew and 
Cortese (2011) stress that current voluntary carbon emissions reporting neglects important 
attributes of corporate reporting, such as reliability and understandability, which might have 
an impact on investors’ decision making. Further, Kolk et al (2008) find that, although an 
increasing number of firms disclose information about their carbon emissions voluntarily, the 
comprehensibility of these disclosures is questionable, whereas Stanny and Ely (2008) stress 
that “… investors in US firms cannot count on receiving information on climate change risk 
through voluntary disclosure” (Stanny and Ely, 2008, p. 347). Similarly, Sullivan and Gouldson 
(2012) conclude that, under a voluntary GHG emissions reporting approach, it is very difficult 
for investors to assess a firm’s emissions-related risks. 
A theoretical justification for the above critique is given by Unerman and O’Dwyer (2007), 
who draw from Giddens’s reflexive modernity concept (as cited in Unerman & O’Dwyer, 2007) 
in terms of the interaction among reflexivity, risk and trust. According to Giddens’s reflexive 
modernity, individuals currently rely heavily upon numerous expert systems because it is 
impossible for any individual to be an expert in all aspects of their lives. By relying on these 
experts, individuals place trust in experts’ actions, although this trust is often given 
unconsciously. Reflexivity refers to new knowledge gained by individuals that makes them 
more aware of expert systems in which they are not experts themselves. In case individuals 
reflexively appropriate new knowledge that raises their perception of risk about a system, some 
of them may regard this level of risk as unacceptable, and consequently, they may withdraw 
their trust in this particular system of experts. It should be noted that the perceived level of risk 
                                                 
6 It is worth stressing that the first hypothesis, although it does not make any new contributions to the literature, 
provides the necessary foundation for testing the two following hypotheses, which examine differences in the 
market valuation of carbon disclosures before vis-à-vis after the introduction of the 2013 Regulation. 
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is not necessarily an objective level, but it may be a socially constructed perception of risk. 
However, “these socially constructed perceptions of risk are just as important and ‘real’ to many 
people in determining their experience of risk as objective distributions of risk” (Unerman & 
O’Dwyer, 2007, p. 335). 
In terms of environmental reporting, firms’ environmental activities (reporting included) 
can be seen as an expert system because only a few stakeholders will be able to evaluate the 
real impact of these activities (Unerman & O’Dwyer, 2007). According to Giddens (as cited in 
Unerman & O’Dwyer, 2007), stakeholders will largely be ignorant of the actual effects of firms’ 
environmental activities, and their perception of risk will not change as long as there is no 
reason for them to think otherwise. Unerman and O’Dwyer (2007) argue that, when a negative 
environmental externality of firms’ activities attracts public attention, stakeholders 
(shareholders included) react reflexively by increasing their socially constructed perception 
about firms’ environmental risk. In turn, this increased perception of risk leads to a reduction 
of shareholders’ trust towards firms’ voluntary disclosures and, consequently, to a decline in 
shareholders’ value (Unerman & O’Dwyer, 2007). In recent years, carbon emissions have come 
into the spotlight as possibly the main cause of global warming (Kauffmann et al, 2012; Stern, 
2007). Hence, following the rationale of Unerman and O’Dwyer (2007), voluntary carbon 
emissions reporting may have lost its trustworthiness, and consequently, capital market 
participants may impose an extra valuation penalty when they value GHG emissions. 
Mandatory GHG emissions reporting has been suggested as a means for mitigating the 
above problem (Kolk et al, 2008; Rankin et al, 2011; Sullivan & Gouldson, 2012). Talking more 
broadly about environmental reporting, Unerman and O’Dwyer (2007) suggest reporting 
regulation as a means of reducing shareholders’ concerns about firms’ environmental risk. 
Reducing shareholders’ risk perception may have favorable impact on shareholders’ trust in 
firms’ disclosures and, consequently, on firms’ value. In the case of carbon emissions, to the 
extent that reporting regulation is expected to forestall shareholders’ negative reflexive 
reaction towards firms’ carbon disclosures, it is reasonable to expect the negative association 
between market value and carbon emissions to decline in magnitude after the introduction of 
a mandatory GHG emissions reporting regulation.  
Although there is no empirical evidence on whether investors value GHG emissions 
differently in a mandatory reporting context (Andrew and Cortese, 2011), some previous 
studies provide interesting insights into similar questions. Bewley (2005) provides evidence 
about differences in the market valuation of booked environmental liabilities accruals before 
vis-à-vis after the introduction of new environmental reporting regulation. Utilizing a sample 
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of Canadian and US firms and using a similar design to that of this study, she provides empirical 
evidence that the valuation coefficient of booked environmental liabilities accrual is negative in 
both periods, but its magnitude is much lower after the introduction of the regulation. 
Furthermore, Hughes (2000) employs a similar design to this research design and shows that 
stringent regulation may lead to a decrease in the magnitude of the negative association 
between market value and sulfur dioxide emissions of US listed firms due to changes in the 
economic and technological factors that the regulation introduces. Another explanation for a 
potential decline in the negative valuation coefficient of emissions is given by Ioannou and 
Serafeim (2014), who stress that a new disclosure regulation may impose implementation of 
new initiatives for emissions reductions and other green activities. To the extent that capital 
markets identify these new initiatives as indeed reducing GHG emissions, it is reasonable to 
expect that investors will re-estimate the discounted future cash outflows that are derived from 
GHG emissions downward. Such a re-estimation will lead to a decrease in the negative valuation 
of emissions. Sullivan (2009) corroborates the position of Ioannou and Serafeim (2014) by 
showing that firms with significant regulatory exposure focus more on activities that reduce 
their GHG emissions. Finally, Clarkson et al (2015) argue that the stringency of the reporting 
regulation will have an impact on investors’ assessment of carbon liabilities. Based on the above 
discussion, the second hypothesis that this study tests is formulated as follows: 
 
H2. The magnitude of the negative association between market value and greenhouse gas 
emissions of firms listed on the London Stock Exchange has declined after emissions reporting 
became mandatory on September 30, 2013, under the amendments of the Companies Act 2006 
(Strategic Report and Directors’ Reports) Regulations 2013. 
 
Finally, Unerman and O’Dwyer (2007) propose that, when a negative environmental 
externality of a firm’s activities attracts public attention, shareholders may increase their 
socially constructed perception about the environmental risk not only of this specific firm but 
also of the whole industry to which the firm belongs. Previous studies acknowledge the strong 
relation between high carbon emissions and specific energy-intensive industries, such as 
manufacturing, pulp and paper, chemicals and basic metals (Lund, 2007). Hence, if the 
proposition of Unerman and O’Dwyer (2007) holds, shareholders’ perception about carbon-
related risk should be higher for firms from energy-intensive industries. Consequently, the 
decline in the negative association between market value and GHG emissions of these firms 
after the introduction of the 2013 Regulation is expected to be larger than that for firms 
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belonging to non-energy-intensive industries. Based on the above discussion, the third 
hypothesis that this study tests is formulated as follows7: 
 
H3. The magnitude of the negative association between market value and greenhouse 
emissions has declined more among firms that belong to energy-intensive industries than for 
firms that belong to non-energy-intensive industries after the introduction of the 2013 
Regulation. 
 
3. Research design 
3.1 Empirical models 
This study examines whether the GHG emissions of firms listed on the LSE are valued by 
market participants and, if so, whether the market valuation of GHG emissions has declined 
after the introduction of the 2013 Regulation, which requires all firms listed on the LSE to 
report their annual GHG emissions in their director’s report for financial years ending on or 
after September 30th, 2013. Following studies such as Baboukardos and Rimmel (2014), Fazzini 
and Dal Maso (2016) and, Siekkinen (2016), the value relevance of GHG emissions is examined 
by employing a model that associates a firm’s market value of equity (PR) with its book value 
of equity (BVS) and earnings (EPS). Following the suggestions of Barth and Clinch (2009), the 
variables are scaled by the number of common shares outstanding six months after the firm’s 
fiscal year-end (Lang et al, 2006)8: 
 
PRit = α0 + α1BVSit + α2EPSit + εit 
 
The model is further expanded by including the main variable of interest, GHG emissions, 
which measures the total annual amount of carbon dioxide and carbon dioxide equivalents (in 
million metric tons) of a firm as it is recorded in the Thomson Reuters ASSET4 database. 
Additionally, in order to control for differences in the earnings’ market valuation of loss-making 
firms (Joos & Plesko, 2005), the indicator variable LOSS is included and is allowed to interact 
with the earnings variable EPS; second, size effects (Berk, 1995) are controlled by using the 
variable SIZE; third, profitability effects (Lourenço et al, 2012) are taken into account by using 
the variable ROE; fourth, the variable LEV controls for leverage (Lins, 2003); and fifth, risk is 
                                                 
7 The author would like to thank a reviewer for this suggestion. 
8 The definitions of all variables and the sources from which the required data are extracted are presented in the 
Appendix. 
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proxied, as suggested by Fama and French (1992), by the ratio of the book value to market 
value of equity (variable BM). Finally, industry (IND) and year (YR) effects are included, and 
firm time-invariant effects are controlled by clustering standard errors by firm (Petersen, 
2009). The final model that examines the first hypothesis is as follows9: 
 
PRit = α0 + α1BVSit + α2EPSit + α3GHGit + α4LOSSit + α5(LOSSit × EPSit) + α6SIZEit + α7ROEit +
α8LEVit + α9BMit + ∑ α10jINDit 
J=9
j=1 + ∑ α11yYRit 
y=2014
y=2011 + εit             (1)    
 
Coefficient α3 is of particular interest for the first hypothesis because it estimates the 
market valuation of GHG emissions. Based on previous studies regarding the value relevance of 
GHG emissions, the coefficient α3 is expected to have a negative sign and be significantly 
different from zero. 
If the second hypothesis holds, then coefficient α3 will be found to be significantly greater 
in the previous period vis-à-vis the period after the 2013 Regulation took effect (that is, 
September 30, 2013). To empirically test this difference, Model (1) is further augmented with 
the period dummy variable D, which equals one for the period after the 2013 Regulation took 
effect (September 30, 2013, to December 31, 2014) and zero for the period before the 2013 
Regulation (January 1, 2011, to August 31, 2013). To examine whether the valuation coefficient 
of GHG emissions differs between the two periods, the interaction term GHGxD is included; 
hence, the final model is the following: 
 
PRit = α0 + α1BVSit + α2EPSit + α3GHGit + α4Dit + α5(GHGit × Dit) + α6LOSSit + α7(LOSSit ×
EPSit) + α8SIZEit + α9ROEit + α10LEVit + α11BMit + ∑ α12jINDit 
J=9
j=1 + ∑ α13yYRit 
y=2014
y=2011 + εit           (2) 
 
If coefficient α3 is negative and significantly different from zero and, at the same time, 
coefficient α5 is found to be positive and statistically significant, then the second hypothesis is 
confirmed, and it can be inferred that capital market participants in the LSE place a less negative 
value on GHG emissions after the introduction of the 2013 Regulation, which rendered GHG 
emissions disclosure mandatory. 
Finally, in order to test the third hypothesis, Model 2 above is estimated again for firms that 
belong to energy-intensive and non-energy-intensive industries separately. Based on the nine 
industries of the Industry Classification Benchmark, as energy-intensive firms are identified as 
those that belong to the Basic Materials, Industrials, Oil and Gas and Utilities industries, 
                                                 
9 Variables definitions are provided in the Appendix. 
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whereas non-energy-intensive firms are identified as those that belong to the remaining 
Consumer Goods, Consumer Services, Health Care, Technology and Telecommunications 
industries (Lund, 2007). Similar to the second hypothesis, the coefficient of interest in this case 
is α5. If the third hypothesis is confirmed, then coefficient α5 should be positive in both 
estimations of Model 2 (i.e., energy-intensive industries and non-energy-intensive industries 
separately) but significantly larger when the model is estimated for firms belonging to the 
energy-intensive industries than for those belonging to the non-energy-intensive industries. 
 
3.2 Sample selection and data sources 
The sample utilized in this study is drawn from the Thomson Reuters ASSET4 database,10 
which provides the GHG emissions data used in this study. For the four-year period under 
examination (2011-2014), the ASSET4 database contains 1,252 firm/year observations of the 
firms listed on the LSE. From the initial 1,252 observations, 248 observations are excluded 
because they belong to the financial industry (Clacher et al, 2013; Dahmash et al, 2009), 217 
are excluded because no GHG emissions data are found, 21 are withdrawn due to missing or 
negative book value of equity (Ahmed et al, 2000; Bugeja and Gallery, 2006), eight are 
eliminated due to missing earnings, and two are eliminated due to missing market value data. 
Finally, 14 observations are identified by Cook’s distance statistic 11  as highly influential 
observations and are also excluded. The final sample consists of 742 firm/year observations 
(Table 1). All data in this study are retrieved from the Thomson Reuters Datastream, 
Worldscope and ASSET4 databases. 
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
4. Findings 
4.1 Data description and univariate analysis 
Descriptive statistics for the full sample as well as for the two periods separately (that is, 
the beginning of 2011 to August 31, 2013, and September 30, 2013, to the end of 2014) for all 
variables used in the regression models are presented in Table 2, Panel A. The average firm of 
the sample has a share price of 8.10 GBP, net assets per share of 3.19 GBP and earnings per 
share of 0.70 GBP. Furthermore, the values of most variables (with the exceptions of EPS and 
                                                 
10  The Thomson Reuters ASSET4 database contains a wide range of environmental, social and governance 
information for almost 5,000 firms around the world. All information is collected from publicly available sources, 
and its quality is scrutinized by experienced analysts (Thomson Reuters, 2015). 
11 Observations with Cook’s distance greater than 4/n, where n is the number of observations, are excluded. 
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ROE) are not significantly different between the two periods. With regard to the main variable 
of interest, the average firm in the sample emits 2.88 million tons of GHG emissions annually. 
The level of emissions is substantially lower than that found in previous similar studies. 
Specifically, Clarkson et al (2015) and Matsumura et al (2014) report 5.25 million and 11.46 
million tons, respectively. Such a large difference can be attributed not only to the different 
settings examined in previous studies (the EU and the US, respectively) but also to the fact that 
both studies examine the value relevance of GHG emissions in earlier time periods (2006-2009 
for the former and 2006-2008 for the latter). Another interesting finding is that the GHG 
emissions in the two periods are quantitatively similar (2.91 million tons before the 2013 
Regulation took effect and 2.85 million tons afterward). This is a favorable finding for the 
empirical design because it further ensures that the results of the multivariate analysis are not 
driven by differences in the magnitude of the variable in the two periods. Finally, Table 2, Panel 
B presents summary statistics for the firms in the energy-intensive and non-energy-intensive 
industries separately. As expected, the average firm in the energy-intensive subsample emits a 
significantly larger volume of GHG than the average firm in the non-energy-intensive 
subsample (4.79 and 0.68 million tons, respectively). 
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
Finally, Table 3 presents Pearson’s correlation coefficients for all variables. Correlation 
coefficients among the independent variables are much less than 0.80, which indicates that 
there is no problem of multicollinearity (Gujarati, 1995). In addition, the variation inflation 
factors in all regression specifications (untabulated) are much less than 10, which further 
confirms that the multivariate analysis results do not suffer from multicollinearity problems 
(Hair et al, 2008). 
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
4.2 Multivariate analysis 
Table 4 presents the results of all regression specifications. First a basic model is estimated 
in which the market value PR is regressed on the two basic accounting variables (BVS and EPS) 
and all other control variables. The next two columns present the estimated coefficients of 
Model 1 and Model 2, which test hypotheses one and two, respectively. The final two columns 
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present the estimated coefficients of Model 2 for the energy-intensive and the non-energy-
intensive industries separately. 
To begin, as expected, both BVS and EPS are positively and significantly associated with PR. 
Furthermore, the coefficient of variable EPSxLOSS is negative and statistically significant at the 
1% level, which is consistent with Joos and Plesko (2005), who show that the earnings 
valuation coefficient of loss-making firms is significantly lower than that of profit-making firms. 
In addition, similar to Lourenço et al (2012), profitability (as proxied by the variable ROE) is 
found to be positively associated with PR; similar to Lins (2003), the leverage LEV is found to 
be negatively related to PR; and finally, similar to Fama and French (1992), risk (as proxied by 
the variable BM) is negatively associated with PR. It should be indicated that these results are 
very similar for all five specifications, with the exception of ROE and LEV coefficients of the 
energy-intensive industries. 
Regarding the first hypothesis, estimating Model 1 reveals that the GHG valuation 
coefficient is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. This finding confirms the first 
hypothesis that GHG emissions are negatively associated with a firm’s market value. Model 1 is 
estimated for the full period under consideration (2011-2014) and hence, it can be postulated 
that the average firm listed on the LSE is penalized by the market for its GHG emissions, 
regardless of whether the emissions are reported on a mandatory or voluntary basis. 
Interestingly, the magnitude of the coefficient (-0.220) is very similar to that found by 
Matsumura et al (2014) in a US setting. 
 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
The main focus of the study, however, is to examine whether the market valuation of GHG 
emissions has declined after the introduction of the 2013 Regulation, which requires all firms 
listed on the LSE to report their GHG emissions for financial years ending on September 30, 
2013, or later. To do so, Model 2 is estimated for the full four-year period. The main variable of 
interest is the interaction term GHGxD, which captures any differences in the magnitude of the 
GHG coefficient between the periods before and after the 2013 Regulation took effect. The third 
column on Table 4 presents the results of estimating Model 2. Similar to the results of Model 1, 
the coefficient α3 of the GHG emissions variable is negative (-0.272) and statistically significant 
at the 1% level. More interestingly, coefficient α5 of the interaction term GHGxD is found to be 
positive (0.106) and statistically significant at the 5% level. This finding indicates that the 
magnitude of the valuation coefficient of GHG emissions for the period after September 30, 
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2013, when GHG emissions reporting became mandatory, is 40% lower than for the period 
before the mandatory introduction of the 2013 Regulation. 
Finally, the last two columns of Table 4 present the estimated coefficients of Model 2 for the 
energy-intensive and non-energy-intensive subsamples separately. For the energy-intensive 
firms, similar to the results of Model 2 for the full sample, the coefficient α3 of the GHG emissions 
variable is negative (-0.171) and statistically significant at the 5% level, and the coefficient α5 
of the interaction term GHGxD is positive (0.070) and statistically significant at the 10% level. 
For the non-energy-intensive firms, however, although the GHG emissions coefficient is 
negative (-0.555) and significant at the 5% level, the coefficient of the interaction term GHGxD 
is not found to be significantly different from zero. These findings indicate that the magnitude 
of the valuation coefficient of GHG emissions for the period after the introduction of the 2013 
Regulation is significantly lower only for the firms that belong to energy-intensive industries. 
 
4.3 Additional analysis 
In addition to the main analysis discussed previously, another analysis is performed to test 
the second and third hypotheses. First, the second hypothesis is tested by comparing the 
market valuation of the GHG emissions in the period before the introduction of the 2013 
Regulation to their market valuation in each of the post-adoption years separately (Table 5, 
Columns 1 and 2); second, the third hypothesis is tested by estimating Model 2 for firms that 
have a high volume of annual emissions and firms that have a low volume of annual emissions 
separately (Table 5, Columns 3 and 4). The findings of all additional tests corroborate the 
results of the main analysis. 
 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
The first two columns of Table 5 present the results of the additional analysis to test 
hypothesis 2. Following Clacher et al (2013), the market valuation of the GHG emissions in the 
period before the introduction of the 2013 Regulation is compared with their market valuation 
in each of the post-adoption years separately (that is, the 3-month period of September 30, 
2013, to December 31, 2013, and the year 2014). Clacher et al (2013) argue that such a per-
year comparison of the post-adoption results gives a better understanding of the persistence of 
the findings throughout time. The results in both cases are very similar to the results of the 
main analysis, although the statistical significance of the coefficient α5 of the interaction term 
GHGxD is not as strong as in the main analysis. The relatively weaker significance of these 
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results can be attributed to the smaller samples employed in these two estimations, which may 
reduce the power of the statistical tests. 
The last two columns of Table 5 refer to the further examination of the third hypothesis, 
which is based on the notion that firms that belong to energy-intensive industries are regarded 
as high emitters and, following the rationale of Unerman and O’Dwyer (2007), these firms are 
more likely to be penalized by the market under a voluntary GHG emissions reporting regime. 
If this indeed is the case, then the introduction of a reporting regulation will be more beneficial 
to these high-polluting firms. The main analysis confirms the third hypothesis of this study by 
providing evidence of a decline in the negative association between market value and carbon 
emissions of firms belonging to energy-intensive industries after the introduction of the 2013 
Regulation. 
Nevertheless, in the main analysis, the categorization of a firm as a high or low emitter is 
conducted based on the industry to which the firm belongs without considering the actual 
volume of a firm’s emissions. In this additional analysis, instead of categorizing firms as high or 
low emitters based on their industry, the categorization is based upon the actual volume of GHG 
a firm emits in a year. Hence, the full sample is divided into high and low emitters based on 
whether a firm’s annual GHG emissions are larger or equal to the sample’s median GHG 
emissions (that is, 0.13 million metric tons). Firms with annual GHG emissions above the 
median are categorized as high emitters and firms with annual GHG emissions below the 
median are categorized as low emitters. The results of the analysis confirm the main analysis. 
The estimation of Model 2 for the high emitters subgroup is similar to previous test results, 
whereas the estimation of Model 2 for the low emitters subgroup provides evidence that not 
only the interaction effect (coefficient α5 of variable GHGxD) but also the main effect (coefficient 
α3 of variable GHG) are not statistically significant. Hence, to the extent that the volume of 
annual GHG emissions drives public attention to a firm’s environmental risks, this finding can 
be seen to support the proposition of Unerman and O’Dwyer (2007) that shareholders’ 
perception of a firm’s environmental risk increases only when its negative environmental 
externalities attract public attention. 
 
5. Discussion and concluding remarks 
This study first examines the market valuation of GHG emissions of firms listed on the LSE. 
Similar to previous studies (Chapple et al, 2013; Clarkson et al, 2015; Matsumura et al, 2014), 
the findings indicate a strong negative association between firms’ annual carbon emissions and 
their market value. Following the rationale of previous studies, it is suggested that this negative 
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association indicates that GHG emissions are used by investors as a proxy for assessing firms’ 
unbooked future environmental liabilities (Hughes, 2000; Clarkson et al, 2004; Matsumura et 
al, 2014). 
Nevertheless, the voluntary character of these disclosures in most jurisdictions around the 
world has been suggested to have a negative effect on their perceived quality by capital market 
participants (Andrew & Cortese, 2011; Kolk et al, 2008; Stanny & Ely, 2008; Sullivan & 
Gouldson, 2012), who may impose an extra penalty when they value environmental liabilities 
(Bewley, 2005). This study adopts the theoretical justification of Unerman and O’Dwyer 
(2007), who draw from Giddens’s reflexive modernity concept (as cited in Unerman & O’Dwyer, 
2007) in terms of the interaction among reflexivity, risk and trust and hypothesizes that the 
introduction of GHG emissions reporting regulations can enhance the trustworthiness of the 
reporting and, hence, reduce the penalty imposed by investors when valuing GHG emissions. 
The benefits of mandatory environmental reporting have been acknowledged by both scholars 
and practitioners (Kolk et al, 2008; de Villiers and van Staden, 2011; Rankin et al, 2011; DEFRA, 
2012; Sullivan and Gouldson, 2012; Paddison, 2013; Tauringana and Chithambo, 2015). 
Nevertheless, whether investors value non-financial environmental information and 
specifically GHG emissions differently in a mandatory reporting context than in a voluntary 
reporting regime is an open empirical question (Andrew and Cortese, 2011). 
This study takes advantage of the recent amendments of the UK Companies Act 2006 
(Strategic Report and Directors’ Reports) Regulations 2013, which requires all firms listed on 
the LSE to report their annual GHG emissions in their director’s report for financial years ending 
on or after September 30, 2013, and shows that although the association between market value 
and carbon emissions has remained significant and negative after the introduction of the 2013 
Regulation, the magnitude of the association is significantly smaller. 
Following Andrew and Cortese (2011), Bewley (2005) and, Unerman and O’Dwyer (2007), 
this study suggests that the decrease in the magnitude of the negative association between 
carbon emissions and market value can be attributed to investors considering mandatory GHG 
emissions reporting as a means of enhancing their reliability. The fact that a decline in the 
magnitude is manifested only in firms that belong to energy-intensive industries can be seen as 
corroborating the proposition of Unerman and O’Dwyer (2007) that when a negative 
environmental externality of a firm’s activities attracts public attention, shareholders may 
increase their perception not only about the environmental risk of this specific firm but also of 
the whole industry to which the firm belongs. 
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Alternatively, the findings of the study may suggest that the introduction of the 2013 
Regulation is observed by investors as a strong signal of future emissions reductions. The 
decline in the valuation coefficient of GHG emissions indicates that for any given amount of GHG 
emissions, investors expect less negative future cash flows after the introduction of the 2013 
Regulation than before. The reasons for this result may be changes in the economic and 
technological factors due to the regulation (Hughes, 2000) or implementation of new initiatives 
for emissions reductions and other green activities imposed by the new regulation (Ioannou 
and Serafeim, 2014). 
Furthermore, following Lee et al (2015), it is suggested that the significantly smaller 
negative valuation coefficient of GHG emissions that is found after the introduction of the 2013 
Regulation may indicate that the new reporting regulation requires firms to report more 
extensively than before. Lee et al (2015) find that the negative relation between carbon 
disclosures and capital market returns is mitigated by the frequency of disclosures. Future 
studies can look at this issue more closely by comparing the level and quality of GHG emissions 
disclosures before and after the introduction of the 2013 Regulation. 
Last, it should be stressed that, although the shortcomings of the current GHG emissions 
reporting approach is well documented (Haslam et al, 2014), this study aims to provide 
empirical evidence on the role of GHG emissions reporting under a mandatory reporting regime 
without, however, challenging the current measurement and reporting framework. Future 
research can address this issue by examining whether there is a difference in the market 
valuation of GHG emissions when reported under different reporting frameworks. For instance, 
does the newly released International Integrated Reporting Framework (IIRC, 2013) provide a 
more adequate framework for reporting GHG emissions?     
In summary, after the introduction of the 2013 Regulation, which requires firms listed on 
the LSE to include carbon emissions data for their entire organization in their annual reports, a 
significant decline in the magnitude of the negative association between firms’ level of GHG 
emissions and market valuation is found. The results are potentially of interest to the academic 
debate on the market valuation implications of GHG emissions, to capital market participants 
and to public and capital market authorities. 
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Tables 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. Sample selection process 
  Firm/Year obs. 
Initial number of observations found in ASSET4 database for the period 2011-2014    1,252   
less  observations from Financials industry   248   
less observations with no available GHG emissions data  217  
less  observations with missing or negative book value of equity   21   
less observations with missing earnings data   8   
less observations with missing market value data  2  
less  highly influential observations identified by Cook’s distance† statistic   14   
Final sample   742   
†Observations with Cook’s distance higher than 4/n, where n is the number of observations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
Panel A Descriptives for H1 & H2 
  Full sample   
Before Regulation 
(01.01.2011-08.31.2013) 
  
After Regulation  
(09.30.2013-12.31.2014)   
  Mean Median S.D.   Mean Median S.D.   Mean Median S.D. 
 (N=742)   (N=403)   (N=339)   
Main variables                        
PR 8.10 5.21 8.14  8.04 5.14 8.17  8.17 5.35 8.12   
BVS 3.19 2.01 3.76  3.29 2.06 3.69  3.06 1.90 3.83   
EPS 0.70 0.43 1.03  0.81 0.49* 1.10  0.58 0.37* 0.94   
GHG 2.88 0.13 10.06  2.91 0.14 9.96  2.85 0.13 10.19   
Controls              
SIZE 14.65 14.5 1.53  14.76 14.56 1.51  14.53 14.39 1.55   
ROE 0.43 0.23 2.11  0.38 0.25* 0.69  0.48 0.20* 3.03  
LEV 2.75 1.39 7.18  2.67 1.48 5.30  2.84 1.34 8.93   
BM 0.60 0.39 0.75  0.62 0.41 0.81  0.56 0.37 0.66   
LOSS 0.08 0.00 0.28  0.06 0.00 0.24  0.11 0.00 0.32   
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Panel B Descriptives for H3 
  Energy-intensive firms   Non-energy-intensive firms   
  
  Mean Median S.D.   Mean Median S.D.   
 (N=398)   (N=344)     
Main variables                  
PR 8.01 5.33 7.90  8.20 5.12 8.42    
BVS 3.57 2.31* 4.30  2.74 1.66* 2.95    
EPS 0.76 0.43 1.15  0.64 0.43 0.88    
GHG 4.79 0.18* 13.38  0.68 0.08* 1.51    
Controls           
SIZE 14.68 14.45 1.55  14.62 14.51 1.50    
ROE 0.27 0.23 0.47  0.61 0.21 3.05   
LEV 2.08 1.35 3.43  3.53 1.43 9.84    
BM 0.63 0.42* 0.67  0.56 0.36* 0.83    
LOSS 0.09 0.00 0.28  0.08 0.00 0.27    
Variables definitions are provided in Appendix 
Panel A.  
Asterisk “*” indicates statistically significant difference between the pre- and post- adoption period at least at 
5% level - Wilcoxon test for median difference is applied 
Panel B.  
Energy-intensive: Firms that belong to Basic Materials, Industrials, Oil and Gas and Utilities industries 
Non-energy intensive: Firms that belong to Consumer Goods, Consumer Services, Health Care, Technology and 
Telecommunications industries 
Asterisk “*” indicates statistically significant difference between the energy-intensive and the non-energy-
intensive firms at least at 5% level - Wilcoxon test for median difference is applied 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Pearson’s correlations coefficients – Full sample 
  PR BVS EPS GHG SIZE ROE LEV BM 
N = 742         
BVS 0.494*        
EPS 0.617* 0.622*       
GHG 0.030 0.446* 0.353*      
SIZE 0.242* 0.493* 0.385* 0.521*     
ROE 0.135* -0.084* 0.088* -0.029 -0.147*    
LEV -0.020 -0.134* 0.023 -0.027 -0.044 0.412*   
BM -0.269* 0.313* -0.075* 0.222* 0.136* -0.118* -0.125*  
LOSS -0.192* -0.059 -0.354* 0.037 -0.019 -0.100* 0.001 0.297* 
* indicates significant correlation at least at 5% level  
Variables definitions are provided in Appendix 
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Table 4. Regressions results 
Model for H1 PRit = α0 + α1BVSit + α2EPSit + α3GHGit + α4LOSSit + α5(LOSSit × EPSit) + α6SIZEit +
α7ROEit + α8LEVit + α9BMit + ∑ α10jINDit 
J=9
j=1 + ∑ α11yYRit 
y=2014
y=2011 + εit 
 
Model for H2 & H3 PRit = α0 + α1BVSit + α2EPSit + α3GHGit + α4Dit + α5(GHGit × Dit) + α6LOSSit +
α7(LOSSit × EPSit) + α8SIZEit + α9ROEit + α10LEVit + α11BMit + ∑ α12jINDit 
J=9
j=1 + ∑ α13yYRit 
y=2014
y=2011 + εit 
Variables Basic model H1 H2 
H3 
Energy-
intensive 
Non-energy 
intensive 
Constant 7.005* -0.709 -0.598 13.175** -1.087 
 (3.743) (3.405) (3.534) (6.267) (4.186) 
      
BVS 0.705*** 0.761*** 0.747*** 1.106*** 0.478** 
 (0.269) (0.274) (0.273) (0.299) (0.225) 
      
EPS 3.646*** 3.985*** 4.132*** 2.140* 7.358*** 
 (1.347) (1.194) (1.186) (1.155) (1.343) 
      
GHG  -0.220*** -0.272*** -0.171** -0.555** 
  (0.074) (0.093) (0.080) (0.266) 
      
D   -0.058 -0.838 0.466 
   (0.766) (1.110) (0.878) 
      
GHGxD   0.106** 0.070* 0.275 
   (0.049) (0.038) (0.306) 
      
Controls      
LOSS 1.093 1.230* 1.252* 1.350 2.265** 
 (0.678) (0.680) (0.679) (1.055) (0.993) 
      
LOSSxEPS -5.394*** -5.710*** -5.988*** -4.049* -8.140*** 
 (1.461) (1.336) (1.345) (2.087) (1.381) 
      
SIZE -0.173 0.378 0.365 -0.275 0.280 
 (0.282) (0.258) (0.256) (0.374) (0.298) 
      
ROE 0.513*** 0.559*** 0.557*** 0.674 0.472*** 
 (0.060) (0.059) (0.058) (1.566) (0.052) 
      
LEV -0.105*** -0.100*** -0.102*** -0.175 -0.090*** 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.196) (0.024) 
      
BM -3.856*** -3.627*** -3.637*** -5.778*** -1.830*** 
 (0.972) (0.901) (0.903) (1.638) (0.660) 
      
Industry effects yes yes yes yes yes 
Year effects yes yes yes Yes yes 
      
N (firm/year) 742 742 742 398 344 
Adj. R2 0.565 0.608 0.611 0.572 0.752 
Energy-intensive: Firms that belong to Basic Materials, Industrials, Oil and Gas and Utilities industries 
Non-energy intensive: Firms that belong to Consumer Goods, Consumer Services, Health Care, Technology and 
Telecommunications industries 
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively 
Robust standard errors (in parentheses) clustered by firm 
Variables definitions are provided in Appendix 
 
25 
 
Table 5. Regressions results – additional analysis 
Model for H2 & H3 PRit = α0 + α1BVSit + α2EPSit + α3GHGit + α4Dit + α5(GHGit × Dit) + α6LOSSit +
α7(LOSSit × EPSit) + α8SIZEit + α9ROEit + α10LEVit + α11BMit + ∑ α12jINDit 
J=9
j=1 + ∑ α13yYRit 
y=2014
y=2011 + εit 
Variables 
H2  H3 
pre- vs 2013 pre- vs 2014  High emitters Low emitters 
Constant -3.713 0.021  5.211 1.654 
 (4.033) (3.451)  (7.257) (4.029) 
      
BVS 0.714** 0.974***  0.962*** 0.310 
 (0.298) (0.247)  (0.296) (0.210) 
      
EPS 3.606*** 4.183***  2.468** 9.621*** 
 (1.151) (1.300)  (1.164) (1.038) 
      
GHG -0.260*** -0.320***  -0.223** -6.319 
 (0.091) (0.099)  (0.086) (11.405) 
      
D -0.243 0.043  -1.438 0.181 
 (0.788) (0.494)  (1.358) (0.731) 
      
GHGxD 0.124* 0.089*  0.090** 12.457 
 (0.063) (0.052)  (0.045) (11.753) 
      
Controls      
LOSS 1.384 0.789  3.285*** 1.485** 
 (0.853) (0.909)  (0.976) (0.649) 
      
LOSSxEPS -6.036*** -7.647***  -5.083** -10.608*** 
 (1.209) (2.558)  (2.055) (1.081) 
      
SIZE 0.553* 0.299  0.202 0.060 
 (0.293) (0.253)  (0.482) (0.292) 
      
ROE 1.584*** 0.540***  3.191** 0.426*** 
 (0.402) (0.057)  (1.301) (0.032) 
      
LEV -0.133*** -0.106***  -0.181*** -0.123*** 
 (0.042) (0.029)  (0.067) (0.016) 
      
BM -3.345*** -3.479***  -4.593*** -1.506*** 
 (0.925) (0.762)  (1.222) (0.539) 
      
Industry effects yes yes  yes yes 
Year effects yes yes  yes yes 
      
N (firm/year) 534 611  371 371 
Adj. R2 0.594 0.659  0.612 0.764 
pre- vs 2013: 01.01.2011–08.31.2013 vs 09.30.2013-12.31.2013 
pre- vs 2014: 01.01.2011–08.31.2013 vs 01.01.2014-12.31.2014 
High emitters: Observations with GHG above the median of the sample (0.13 million metric tons) 
Low emitters: Observations with GHG below the median of the sample (0.13 million metric tons) 
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively 
Robust standard errors (in parentheses) clustered by firm 
Variables definitions are provided in Appendix 
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Appendix 
 
Variables definitions 
Variables Description   
PR Market value of equity (Datastream  item identifier: MV) six months after fiscal year-
end scaled by the number of common shares (Datastream  item identifier: 
WC05301) 
BVS Book value of equity (Datastream  item identifier: WC03995) scaled by the number 
of common shares (Datastream  item identifier: WC05301) 
EPS Earnings before interest and taxation (Datastream  item identifier: WC18191) 
scaled by the number of common shares (Datastream  item identifier: WC05301) 
GHG Total greenhouse gas emissions in million metric tons. (ASSET4 identifier: 
ENERDP023) 
D Binary variable which equals one for the period after the Companies Act 2006 
(Strategic Report and Directors’ Reports) Regulations 2013 took affect (i.e. 
09.30.2013-12.31.2014) and zero for the period before (i.e. 01.01.2011-
08.31.2013) 
LOSS Binary variable which equals one if EPS is negative and zero otherwise 
SIZE Natural logarithm of total assets (Datastream  item identifier: WC02999) 
ROE Return on equity computed as earnings before interest and taxation (Datastream  
item identifier: WC18191) divided by book value of equity (Datastream  item 
identifier: WC03995) 
LEV Leverage computed as total liabilities (Datastream  item identifier: WC03351) 
divided by book value of equity (Datastream  item identifier: WC03995) 
BM Book-to-market ratio computed as book value of equity (Datastream  item 
identifier: WC03995) to market value of equity (Datastream  item identifier: MV) 
  
IND Multiple dummy variable based on the nine out of the ten industries (Financials 
industry excluded) of the Industry Classification Benchmark (Datastream  item 
identifier: ICBIC) 
YR Multiple dummy variable based on the four years under examination 
All variables are based on data extracted from Thomson Reuters Datastream, Worldscope and ASSET4 databases  
 
 
 
